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1699 
THE JUSTICE AGAINST SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM ACT: AN INFRINGEMENT  
ON EXECUTIVE POWER 
Abstract: In the more than sixteen years since September 11, 2001, the Unit-
ed States has resolved, through policy at home and abroad, to vindicate the he-
roes and victims of that attack. From the creation of the Department of Home-
land Security, to the raid that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Laden, the 
shockwaves of 9/11 have reverberated through America’s domestic and for-
eign policy ever since. In the only veto override of the Obama presidency, the 
114th U.S. Congress brought the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act 
(“JASTA”) into force, intending to provide U.S. citizens with a basis to seek 
relief against persons, entities, and foreign governments that offered material 
support to terrorist acts occurring on or after 9/11. Now, empowered by Con-
gress, private citizens and the courts can disrupt the President’s unified for-
eign policy with respect to the suspect nation, an impermissible violation of 
the separation of powers doctrine. This Note argues that JASTA unconstitu-
tionally allows private litigants and the courts to delve into the executive for-
eign affairs power, determining America’s stance on another nation’s respon-
sibility for international terrorism. 
INTRODUCTION 
The names of 404 U.S. citizens, each of whom lost a parent on 9/11, 
are signed beneath an impassioned letter to congressional leadership.1 These 
citizens urged Congress to ease the pain of their loss by passing the Justice 
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”).2 Some of the signatories, 
not yet born at the time of the attack, have a parent they will never know.3 
At its core, JASTA provides U.S. citizens the ability to seek relief in the 
federal courts for acts of terrorism committed in the United States.4 Prior to 
                                                                                                                           
 1 An Open Letter to Congress from the 9/11 Children for Justice Against Terrorism, PASS-
JASTA.ORG (Aug. 16, 2016), http://passjasta.org/2016/08/open-letter-congress-911-children-justice-
terrorism/ [https://perma.cc/FE9R-ZHZP] (describing the desire to seek resolution and recompense 
for the loss of their parents). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See id. (noting the ages, including those in utero on September 11, 2001, of children who 
lost parents during the attacks). 
 4 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (expanding the exceptions to foreign sover-
eign immunity by removing limitations on the number of nations over which a U.S. court may 
have jurisdiction for cases arising out of acts of international terrorism); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1604 
(2012) (affording immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S courts to the government of a foreign 
nation, subject to the limitations in §§ 1605–1607). JASTA withdraws sovereign immunity for 
1700 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 58:1699 
JASTA’s enactment, American citizens could only bring suit against a for-
eign nation for involvement in international terrorism if the President had 
previously designated that nation a state sponsor of terror.5 JASTA elimi-
nates this prior designation requirement through an expansion of the excep-
tions to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), which, in keeping 
with international norms, bars many lawsuits against foreign governments.6 
In the more than sixteen years since September 11, 2001, the United 
States has resolved, through policy at home and abroad, to vindicate the 
heroes and victims of that attack.7 From the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security to the raid that resulted in the death of Osama Bin Lad-
en, the shockwaves of 9/11 have reverberated through America’s domestic 
and foreign policy.8 JASTA is considered by many a necessary next step in 
the long road to vindication, allowing 9/11 families to seek justice against 
foreign governments that may have been involved in the attack.9 Although 
JASTA is constructed to apply against any nation or agent of a nation that 
                                                                                                                           
countries that may have previously been immune from terrorism suits as a jurisdictional matter, 
but it also expands civil liability causes of action under the Antiterrorism Act. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1605B; see also Alison Bitterly, Can Banks Be Lia-
ble for Aiding and Abetting Terrorism?: A Closer Look into the Split on Secondary Liability Un-
der the Antiterrorism Act, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3389, 3400 (2015) (describing JASTA’s role in 
expanding secondary liability, particularly for banks, as part of JASTA’s expansion of causes of 
actions, distinct from the Act’s impact on foreign sovereign immunity). This Note focuses on the 
expanded jurisdiction that JASTA creates by expanding the terrorism exception to foreign sover-
eign immunity. See infra notes 20–220 and accompanying text. 
 5 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012) (detailing the previously existing state sponsor of terror ex-
ception to foreign sovereign immunity). 
 6 See id. § 1605B (expanding the exceptions to the FSIA to include nations not previously 
designated a state sponsor of terror by the executive); Juan C. Basombrio, Nations on Trial, L.A. 
LAW., Apr. 2017, at 16, 18 (describing, in the wake of JASTA, the international norms encapsu-
lated by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act). 
 7 See 107 CONG. REC. PM43 (2001) (noting the fact that the President’s address was delivered to 
a Joint Session of Congress); SELECTED SPEECHES OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, GEORGE W. 
BUSH WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES 65–73 (2001), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T75-
8A72] (committing the nation, in a speech from President Bush to the Joint session of Congress 
just nine days after the attacks, to a lengthy campaign to pursue terrorism). 
 8 See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2142 (creating the 
Department of Homeland Security as a stand-alone, cabinet-level department to further coordinate 
and unify national homeland security efforts); Macon Phillips, Osama Bin Laden Dead: Remarks by 
the President on Osama Bin Laden, WHITE HOUSE (May 2, 2011, 12:16 AM) https://www.white
house.gov/blog/2011/05/02/osama-bin-laden-dead [https://perma.cc/V5Z8-LJLH] (describing the 
impact of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent efforts to pursue Osama Bin Laden in an address to 
the nation, televised from the Yellow Room of the White House). 
 9 See Chuck Schumer & John Cornyn, Give 9/11 Families Legal Avenue: Opposing View, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 27, 2016, 6:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/09/27/911-families-
chuck-schumer-john-cornyn-editorials-debates/91183890/ [https://perma.cc/2XU2-BT3N] (arguing, 
as the two sponsors of bill S.2040 in the U.S. Senate, in favor of giving 9/11 families legal re-
course against foreign nations for harm suffered during the attacks). 
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engages in tortious acts providing substantial support to acts of terrorism 
against the United States, the principal impetus for the Act is to provide vic-
tims a basis to seek relief against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its pos-
sible involvement in the 9/11 attacks.10 JASTA further facilitates civil liabil-
ity for foreign governments for aiding and abetting terrorist acts.11 
JASTA was introduced in the Senate on September 16, 2015 and suc-
cessfully passed both chambers by September 9, 2016.12 On September 23, 
2016, President Barack Obama vetoed the bill.13 For the first and only time 
during the eight-year Obama Presidency, Congress legislatively overrode 
the President’s veto five days later, and JASTA became law.14 
This Note argues that JASTA intrudes upon the foreign affairs power 
of the Executive, an area in which the President’s authority has long been 
recognized.15 This Note further argues that JASTA unconstitutionally vio-
lates the separation of powers doctrine.16 Part I of this Note examines the 
status of the law prior to JASTA with respect to executive power, foreign 
sovereign immunity, and the separation of powers doctrine, as well as rele-
vant provisions of JASTA itself and public reactions to the law.17 Part II of 
this Note evaluates the Executive as the best chooser for America’s stance 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See id. (noting the sponsors of the bill believe there is a moral imperative to provide 9/11 fami-
lies with a day in court); The Editorial Board, Uphold Veto on 9/11 Lawsuits: Our View, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 27, 2016, 5:54 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/09/27/911-lawsuits-saudi-
arabia-congress-veto-obama-editorials-debates/91149628/ [https://perma.cc/K56C-XK7P] [hereinaf-
ter Uphold Veto on 9/11 Lawsuits] (recognizing the difficulties of litigating 9/11 cases and calling 
JASTA a last-ditch effort to allow families of 9/11 victims to bring suit against Saudi Arabia); 
James Zogby, JASTA: Irresponsible and Dangerous, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 1, 2016, 7:55 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-zogby/jasta-irresponsible-and-d_b_12269448.html [https://
perma.cc/MG87-HL8M] (describing the primary purpose of the Act as a vehicle for 9/11 victim 
suits against Saudi Arabia). This Note does not evaluate the merits of a case against the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, but instead focuses solely upon JASTA’s implications for executive power over 
foreign affairs. See infra notes 20–120 and accompanying text. 
 11 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222, § 4, 130 Stat. 851, 
854 (2016) (describing the alterations to the existing foreign sovereign immunity exceptions, 
causes of action against foreign nations, and the common law framework for judicially evaluating 
aiding and abetting and conspiracy liability in federal civil cases). 
 12 See S.2040—Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.
congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2040/all-actions [https://perma.cc/ER3X-QVM9] [here-
inafter JASTA History] (listing all Congressional actions with respect to S.2040, from introduction to 
enactment by overriding a Presidential veto). 
 13 See Veto Message from the President—S.2040, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 23, 2016), https://obama
whitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/09/23/veto-message-president-s2040 [https://perma.
cc/R2U6-TMXM] [hereinafter Veto Message from the President] (describing the principal reasons 
President Obama returned S.2040 to Congress unsigned). 
 14 See JASTA History, supra note 12 (listing all Congressional actions with respect to S.2040, 
from introduction to enactment by overriding a Presidential veto). 
 15 See infra notes 20–220 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 20–220 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 20–123 and accompanying text. 
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on a foreign nation’s responsibility for terror.18 Finally, Part III argues that 
JASTA is unconstitutional because the Act infringes upon a function proper-
ly entrusted to the President because the nation should speak to the interna-
tional community with one voice: the Executive’s.19 
I. BEFORE AND AFTER JASTA: A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF  
EXECUTIVE POWER IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
The discord between the 114th Congress and President Barack Obama 
surrounding the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”) high-
lights an area of constitutional law that is long-standing, yet still unsettled: 
the extent of executive power in the field of foreign affairs and the ability of 
Congress and the Judiciary to participate in that field.20 This area is particu-
larly relevant because the current Presidential administration, faced with the 
present posture of U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, may be forced to weigh 
how stridently to challenge Congress on the scope of executive power in 
foreign affairs.21 
Section A of this Part examines traditional notions of executive 
power and Section B evaluates the constitutional doctrine of separation 
of powers.22 Next, Section C discusses the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act.23 Section D describes JASTA’s operative provisions.24 Then, 
Section E weighs the response, both domestically and abroad, to the 
                                                                                                                           
 18 See infra notes 124–169 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 170–219 and accompanying text. 
 20 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 396–97 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing the 
history of the foreign affairs power); John C. Yoo, Foreign Affairs Federalism and the Separation 
of Powers, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1341, 1346 (2001) (describing the growing power of the executive 
over foreign affairs throughout U.S. history for reasons of structure, speed, and efficiency). 
 21 See Mark Hensch, Trump Slams Obama for ‘Shameful’ 9/11 Bill Veto, THE HILL (Sept. 23, 
2016, 6:18 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/297558-trump-rips-obama-for-
shameful-9-11-veto [https://perma.cc/3H5Y-7SRS] (releasing then-candidate Donald Trump’s re-
sponse to President Barack Obama’s veto and explaining the candidate’s disdain for the incumbent’s 
decision, in addition to the reactions of others); Jonathan Masters, U.S. Foreign Policy Powers: Con-
gress and the President, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Mar. 2, 2017), https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/us-foreign-policy-powers-congress-and-president [https://perma.cc/B93P-PQ9A] (dis-
cussing presidential pushback to congressional efforts to curtail executive prerogatives in foreign 
affairs). Although possibly little more than a campaign device, Donald Trump, in a statement made in 
the hours following President Obama’s JASTA veto, called the veto one of the low points of the 
Obama Presidency, and offered his intent to sign any similar legislation in the future. See Hensch, 
supra. This leaves open the question of whether, or how, the Trump administration might address 
legislative challenges to executive power. See id. 
 22 See infra notes 27–72 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 73–95 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 96–102 and accompanying text. 
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legislation.25 Finally, Section F discusses the political question doctrine 
of prudential standing.26 
A. Executive Power in Foreign Affairs Prior to JASTA 
There is no express foreign affairs power provision in the U.S. Consti-
tution.27 Rather, the power to direct the nation’s foreign policy decisions is 
drawn from several places throughout the document.28 Congress is vested 
with the power to regulate foreign commerce, to define and punish offenses 
against the law of nations, to declare war, and the Senate must advise and 
consent to the appointment of ambassadors and entering into treaties.29 The 
Executive, in contrast, is responsible for a distinct set of foreign affairs 
functions, including commander in chief of the armed forces, the power to 
make treaties and appoint ambassadors, and the responsibility of receiving 
foreign ambassadors and other public ministers.30 
The Constitution presumes the Legislature and the Executive will both 
fill important roles in pursuing the nation’s interests abroad.31 The division 
of discrete responsibilities, which cumulatively compose one broader for-
eign affairs power, is an inevitable source of tension, requiring judicial de-
terminations to the extent each branch may act independently of the other 
without overstepping constitutional bounds.32 
For example, in 1936, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Cor-
poration, the Supreme Court afforded unparalleled deference to the Presi-
dent’s power over foreign affairs.33 Congress resolved to grant the President 
                                                                                                                           
 25 See infra notes 103–113 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 114–123 and accompanying text. 
 27 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 369 (describing the absence of a single express provi-
sion for foreign affairs). See generally U.S. CONST. (noting the absence of a singular provision 
dedicating an express foreign affairs power to one branch of government, but rather enumerating 
foreign affairs functions in multiple locations). 
 28 See generally U.S. CONST. (noting the delegation of authority to regulate foreign com-
merce, declare war, powers to appoint, confirm, and receive ambassadors, and to raise and com-
mand armed forces). 
 29 U.S. CONST. arts. I–II (enumerating the powers of the legislature). 
 30 Id. at art. II. 
 31 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (describing Congress’s role in 
conducting foreign affairs and recognizing that Congress may limit the array of options available 
to the President through legislative measures with respect to international relations); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (recognizing the 
Constitution’s contemplation that the structure of American government would diffuse power for 
the greater preservation of liberty, but the branches of government, although separate, would be 
interdependent). 
 32 See Masters, supra note 21 (discussing tensions between the White House and Capitol Hill 
with respect to power over American foreign policy). 
 33 See 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (discussing the foreign affairs power inherent in government 
and the role of the executive, specifically). 
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discretion to impose an embargo on arms shipments to Latin American 
countries engaged in conflict.34 The Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was 
charged with violating an embargo promulgated in accordance with that 
resolution.35 The Court acknowledged the singular and discretionary power 
of the President to conduct international relations, referring to the President 
as the “sole organ” of foreign affairs authority.36 The Court noted that the 
President possesses some non-textual, yet significant and generally unilat-
eral, foreign affairs power—even though President Roosevelt drew upon a 
congressional grant of authority.37 
The Curtiss-Wright understanding of executive power is, however, far 
from unassailable.38 Scholars have challenged Justice Sutherland’s decision 
as misreading the separation of foreign affairs responsibilities made explicit 
in the Constitution.39 
In 2000, in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, the U.S. Su-
preme Court evaluated a Massachusetts law that conflicted with federal law 
with respect to trade and the broader relationship between the United States 
and Burma.40 Congress expressly granted the President sweeping authority 
to develop a comprehensive scheme for enhancing American-Burmese rela-
tions as the Burmese government took additional steps to ease U.S. con-
cerns regarding human rights violations in Burma.41 
                                                                                                                           
 34 See id. at 311–13 (discussing the joint resolution of Congress and President Roosevelt’s 
subsequent ban on the sale of arms and munitions to Latin American countries engaged in con-
flict). 
 35 See id. at 311 (discussing the corporation’s indictment); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Pres-
idential Power over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 208 (2009) 
(describing Curtiss-Wright’s recognition of the President as the sole representative for the nation 
in the conduct of foreign affairs). 
 36 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319 (noting that despite the vastness of the realm of foreign 
affairs, the President alone is the nation’s representative). 
 37 See id. (explaining the degree of latitude and freedom from statutory restraint due a Presi-
dent engaging in international relations); see also KindHearts for Charitable Humanitarian Dev., 
Inc. v. Geithner, 647 F. Supp. 2d 857, 877–78 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (describing Curtiss-Wright in 
relation to the steel mill seizures in Youngstown, and noting the Court’s deference to the execu-
tive’s unique and nearly unilateral authority over foreign relations in Curtiss-Wright); Hathaway, 
supra note 35, at 208 (noting even the President’s power as the sole communicator for the nation 
should not be viewed as unfettered power). 
 38 See Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine, 37 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 139, 149–50 (2007) (evaluating academic criticisms of Justice Sutherland’s 
opinion); Hathaway, supra note 35, at 209 (arguing that sole empowerment to speak is not equiva-
lent to singularity as a relevant actor in foreign affairs). 
 39 See Fisher, supra note 38 (listing scholars’ opinions as to the misleading descriptions of 
presidential power in Curtiss-Wright, the tenuous distinctions between foreign and domestic af-
fairs, and more modern conceptualizations of the earliest American sovereignty). 
 40 530 U.S. 363, 368 (2000) (discussing the fullness of the record with respect to the evidence 
of the infringement on the President’s ability to conduct foreign affairs). 
 41 See id. at 373–74 (describing the Court’s view of the state law as an obstacle to the effec-
tive implementation of the federal act). The President was empowered to limit new investment and 
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In reviewing the conflict between the state and federal laws, the Cros-
by Court placed great emphasis on “the very capacity of the President to 
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments.”42 
The Court invalidated the state law by applying the doctrine of preemption 
because the state law hindered “the President’s power to speak and bargain 
effectively with other nations.”43 
Much like Curtiss-Wright’s sole organ theory, Crosby’s one-voice theory 
of foreign relations powers is subject to critique.44 Scholars criticize the one-
voice theory as failing to adequately account for the nuance of the American 
constitutional system and the shared responsibilities of the Executive and the 
Legislature in conduct of international relations.45 Nonetheless, although mul-
tiple participants speaking a single message in foreign affairs is possible in 
theory, such consistency is difficult to marshal in practice.46 
The belief that the nation should speak with one voice, the driving the-
oretical force behind the consolidation of foreign affairs power into the ex-
ecutive branch, is laced throughout constitutional jurisprudence.47 For ex-
ample, in cases where the Supreme Court is reviewing a regulatory scheme 
with the potential to embarrass the United States, the Court is hesitant to 
allow the diffusion of foreign affairs authority to many voices because the 
                                                                                                                           
to work with regional partners, including multinational organizations, to create a comprehensive 
strategy for the improvement of democratic government in Burma. Id. at 368–69. 
 42 Id. at 381–82. 
 43 Id. 
 44 See David Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 957, 991–1023 (2014) (dis-
cussing the theoretical and practical drawbacks of the one-voice doctrine, after noting the limited 
quantity of scholarship centered on the doctrine). 
 45 See id. at 998–99 (describing the distribution of powers relating to foreign affairs to all 
three coordinate branches of government and also highlighting the interdependence of the branch-
es, such that even those powers dedicated to the executive rely on related authorities granted to the 
legislature). 
 46 See id. (noting instances where a supermajority is necessary in the Senate to execute the 
full array of foreign affairs functions); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The 
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 237–41 (2001) (asserting that no theo-
ry adequately advances the notion of executive primacy in foreign affairs and considers the effort 
to develop such a theory a “fruitless search”). 
 47 See generally Moore, supra note 44 (discussing the history of the one-voice doctrine and 
arguing the doctrine is divorced from practical application, but also noting the doctrine has re-
ceived little scholarly attention). The doctrine is equally relevant in dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence and the preemption of state action with respect to foreign affairs, in addition to its 
significance for the relationship between the political branches of government. See id. (evaluating 
the relationship between the dormant Commerce Clause, federal preemption, and the one-voice 
doctrine); see also Michael G. Keeley, Comment, Barclay’s Bank PLC v. The Franchise Tax 
Board: Has the Supreme Court Emasculated the One Voice Doctrine?, 8 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 133, 
152–53 (1995) (describing the one-voice doctrine when the federal government regulates com-
merce with a foreign nation, particularly with respect to conflicting state and federal tax policy). 
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ensuing cacophony imperils the clarity of the United States’ position and 
may result in embarrassing, contradictory statements.48 
This is not to say, however, the President’s foreign affairs power is 
without limit.49 In 2015, in Zivotofsky ex rel Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Su-
preme Court held that Congress plays a critical role in foreign policy and 
may act independent of the President in some legislative decisions relating 
to international affairs, binding the President’s international actions by the 
laws it enacts.50 Zivotofsky is also meaningful because it delineated recogni-
tion of a foreign government, under the power enumerated in Article II of 
the U.S. Constitution to receive ambassadors.51 The President has singular 
recognition authority, meaning only the Executive may determine whether 
the U.S. formally recognizes a foreign government.52 
The significant principle in Zivotofsky, though, that Congress may act 
independently of the President and may limit some of the executive’s interna-
tional actions by the laws Congress enacts, is not a recent development.53 In 
1804, in Little v. Barreme, Chief Justice Marshall found that President John 
Adams had no special authority to expand the scope of the embargo powers 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440–41 (1968) (describing the potential for an Ore-
gon inheritance statute to cause controversy on the international scene because of Oregon’s depar-
ture from the centralized position of the federal government). 
 49 See Daniel Abebe, One Voice or Many? The Political Question Doctrine and Acoustic 
Dissonance in Foreign Affairs, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 244 (discussing how centralization of the 
foreign affairs “voice” from the states to the federal government is appropriate, but such logic may 
not carry over with respect to Congress and the President, or even the courts). 
 50 See 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015) (noting in both foreign and domestic spheres, primacy in 
the creation of law resides with the legislature, but also recognizing the President should not be 
forced by Congress to contradict himself in foreign affairs). The law challenged by the executive 
branch in Zivotofsky required a U.S. consulate to issue a passport to a child born in Jerusalem to 
American parents and to designate the child’s birthplace as Israel, rather than Jerusalem, the ad-
ministration’s preferred designation. See id. at 2083. The Court held the law exceeded the scope of 
Congress’s power to regulate passports and impermissibly interfered with United States foreign 
policy by contradicting the President’s recognition decision. See id. at 2086. This challenge came 
only after a prior Supreme Court determination the case was justiciable and not a political ques-
tion. See generally Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189 (2012) (describing the previous case, lim-
ited in scope to the issue of standing). 
 51 See Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090 (noting the uniquely executive power of recognition as 
an outgrowth of the reception power and describing the practical significance of that authority). 
 52 See id. (affirming the President’s constitutional authority to receive ambassadors necessari-
ly endows the executive with the singular power to identify which governments the United States 
will recognize in the conduct of international relations). 
 53 See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177 (1804) (barring an additional grant of 
authority, the Commander in Chief was not empowered to expand the scope of vessel seizure 
during hostilities between the United States and France); see also Hathaway, supra note 35, at 208 
(discussing the limitations on the President’s foreign affairs power, even as the sole representative 
of the nation). 
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enacted by Congress, suggesting a very early understanding that executive 
power in foreign affairs could be limited through acts of Congress.54 
B. Separation of Powers Doctrine 
The separation of powers doctrine, like the foreign affairs power, is not 
expressly mentioned in the Constitution.55 Yet separation of powers is in-
herent in the document’s structure.56 In the creation of a tri-part govern-
ment, the inclusion of enumerated powers, and in granting each branch 
mechanisms from which to police the outer bounds of the others’ power, the 
founders assured a system of checks and balances with a distinct and endur-
ing separation of powers.57 
The absence of explicit constitutional text describing this separation 
makes enforcing the principle all the more difficult.58 The self-imposed re-
straints of each branch are an initial safeguard, but when these are insuffi-
cient, it falls to the courts to resolve questions of separation of powers.59 
There is little history of a precise and consistent analytic framework applied 
by the courts to resolve separation of powers controversies, but Justice 
Powell has offered perhaps the most useful description.60 Concurring in 
                                                                                                                           
 54 Little, 6 U.S. at 177. 
 55 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 369 (describing the separation of powers doctrine). 
See generally U.S. CONST. (observing the absence of a singular, comprehensive foreign affairs 
power). 
 56 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring) (describing the Constitution’s diffusion of power to secure liberty, but also recognizing 
the interdependence of the three branches necessary to form a functional government capable of 
serving the needs of the people). See generally U.S. CONST. (noting the decentralized delegation 
of power throughout the broader government). 
 57 See Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (describing the implicit 
constitutional mandate, for each of the three general branches of government to remain free from 
coercion by the other branches). 
 58 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 369–70 (describing the role of the courts in striking 
the appropriate balance of power between coordinate branches of government, the absence of 
constitutional textual provisions regarding separation of powers, and the difficulties of relying on 
the framers’ intent in this area). 
 59 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–83 (1989) (describing the role of the 
Court in giving voice to and reaffirming the separation of powers, a feature of the Constitution the 
framers believed was imperative to the preservation of liberty in America). 
 60 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (creating two catego-
ries of actions that may violate the separation of powers doctrine: impermissible interference in 
the performance of a function constitutionally assigned to a coordinate branch of government, or 
assumption of a function ore properly entrusted to another branch); see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 
383 (describing the diverse sources from which separation of powers doctrine and jurisprudence is 
drawn, and also noting additional jurisprudence relating specifically to the integrity of the courts, 
not addressed by Justice Powell’s Chadha concurrence); Matthew James Tanielian, Separation of 
Power and the Supreme Court: One Doctrine, Two Visions, 8 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 961, 965–73 
(1995) (providing a discussion of functionalist and formalist strands of separation of powers juris-
prudence). 
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1983 in Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, Justice Powell 
wrote: 
Functionally, the doctrine [of separation of powers] may be vio-
lated in two ways. One branch may interfere impermissibly with 
the other’s performance of its constitutionally assigned function. 
Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch as-
sumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another.61 
Case law demonstrates the function of each of the two types of separa-
tion of powers violations.62 In the first of these two distinct types of viola-
tions, which Justice Powell called an impermissible interference with a con-
stitutionally assigned function of a coordinate branch, courts balance the 
interests of the two competing branches of government.63 
The Supreme Court determined in both United States. v. Nixon and 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services that an absolute separation of 
the branches of government was undesirable and some interference by one 
branch of government into the interests of another branch was inevitable.64 
To determine whether an interference was constitutionally impermissible, 
the Court noted the appropriate legal standard was a functionalist balancing 
of undue disruption to the accomplishment of constitutionally assigned 
functions against the need to promote objectives clearly within the constitu-
tional authority of a coordinate branch of government.65 
In its 1986 decision, Bowsher v. Synar, the Supreme Court weighed the 
degree to which Congress had interfered with the enforcement of a law 
Congress itself had enacted, an intrusion into the executive function to en-
                                                                                                                           
 61 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 62 See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 382–83 (describing the Court’s separation of powers jurispru-
dence and describing the veins of cases that collectively ensure the inherent tendencies of each 
branch of government to exceed the bounds of its authority remain in check). 
 63 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring) (detailing the two separate analyses 
for differing types of separation of powers violations). 
 64 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (holding President’s Nixon claim of 
presidential privilege regarding certain White House tapes was insufficient). The Court found that 
where the only interest asserted by the President was one of general confidentiality, and not a 
particularized need for secrecy surrounding specific elements of presidential activity, the interest 
failed to overcome the value of the truth-seeking function of the judiciary. Id.; see also Nixon v. 
Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 439–46 (1977) (finding a law requiring the archiving and 
screening of presidential materials did not violate the separation of powers doctrine). The Court 
held that because retention of the materials in archives did not interfere with the accomplishment 
of functions constitutionally assigned to the executive, but instead merely required the mainte-
nance of documents produced in the course of accomplishing constitutionally assigned functions, 
any interference was permissible. Id. 
 65 See Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 442–43 (balancing the need for recordkeep-
ing against the minimal disruption to executive functions); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707 
(weighing the function of the judiciary against the occasional need for executive secrecy). 
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force the laws the Legislature passes.66 Although the Bowsher Court applied 
a slightly different formulation than the Nixon test, both tests examine the 
impact of a coordinate branch’s action on the other branch and the need for 
action by the interfering branch.67 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer is an example of the second 
form of separation of powers violation described by Justice Powell, as-
sumption of a function more properly entrusted to a coordinate branch of 
government.68 In Youngstown, President Truman’s attempt to take posses-
sion of and operate the majority of the nation’s steel mills did not interfere 
with congressional lawmaking functions, but instead amounted to an im-
permissible legislative act.69 In essence, the President had usurped the law-
making function of Congress in his effort to regulate steel production.70 The 
analysis for this type of separation of powers violation evaluates the degree 
to which one branch performs the function of another branch.71 This is dis-
tinct from an impermissible interference violation, which is analyzed by 
balancing undue disruption to the accomplishment of constitutionally as-
signed functions against the need to promote objectives clearly within the 
constitutional authority of a coordinate branch of government.72 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See 478 U.S. 714, 734 (1986) (detailing the legislature’s improper intrusion into executive 
powers). In Bowsher, the Court examined whether a newly enacted law intended to control budget 
deficits was unconstitutional. Id. at 733. The Court determined that Congress had delegated au-
thority to the Comptroller General, a legislative branch official, to execute budget cuts. Id. By 
passing the law and granting a member of the larger legislative apparatus the power to enforce the 
law, a function constitutionally assigned to the executive, Congress had violated the separation of 
powers doctrine. Id. at 734. 
 67 See id. at 734 (invalidating an attempt by Congress to exercise the removal function over an 
official performing executive enforcement functions); Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. at 
442–43; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707. 
 68 See 343 U.S. at 588 (describing the President’s actions and the unlawfulness of a legislative 
act by the executive); see also Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring) (describing the 
two principle categories of separation of powers violations); Gillian E. Metzger, Appointments, 
Innovation, and the Judicial-Political Divide, 64 DUKE L.J. 1607, 1636 (2015) (linking Youngs-
town and Chadha as similar examples of one branch’s failure to curb unconstitutional overreach 
by a coordinate branch of government). 
 69 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–88 (describing the facts and rationale for the holding). 
 70 See id. (describing the facts of the case). 
 71 See generally Bowsher, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (employing a balancing test to determine the 
appropriateness of one branch of government’s interference with another branch); Nixon v. Admin. 
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (balancing the need for recordkeeping against the minimal disruption 
to Executive functions); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (weighing the function of the judici-
ary against the occasional need for executive secrecy). 
 72 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588 (analyzing President Truman’s impermissible legislative 
act). 
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C. Congress and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
In 1976, Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
(FSIA).73 The Act grants immunity to foreign states from jurisdiction in 
U.S. courts, subject to limited exceptions.74 This Section addresses the pre-
JASTA status of the FSIA.75 
The FSIA advanced the principal thrust of the then-existing common 
law, that a foreign state is presumptively immune from civil suits in the 
United States, but created a series of exceptions from such immunity, par-
ticularly where the foreign state is involved in commercial activity in the 
United States.76 In the next three subsections, this Section discusses the two 
exceptions relevant to JASTA, the tort and terrorism exceptions, as well as 
Congressional power over the courts.77 
1. State Sponsors of Terror 
Each year, the Secretary of State is statutorily required to submit to 
Congress country reports on terrorism.78 In that report, the State Department 
weighs the extent to which foreign nations repeatedly provide support to 
acts of international terror.79 The Secretary of State produces a finding that 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611 (2012).  
 74 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (codifying the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
and providing exceptions to the general presumption a foreign state is immune from the jurisdiction 
of U.S courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (providing a general grant of immunity to foreign nations); see also 
28 U.S.C. § 1330 (granting original jurisdiction over civil actions against foreign nations to the U.S. 
District Courts in those cases where an exception to the FSIA is applicable). 
 75 See infra notes 78–95 and accompanying text. 
 76 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (providing a general grant of immunity to foreign nations); id. § 1605 
(describing instances when foreign sovereign immunity may not be invoked by a foreign state 
defendant in U.S. courts); id. § 1605A (creating a foreign sovereign immunity exception for suits 
arising out of terrorist actions when defendant countries have been designated a state sponsor of 
terror). Immunity does not apply in cases of voluntary waiver, when the foreign government is 
conducting commercial activity in the United States, property is taken in violation of international 
law, property acquired by the United States is at issue, the case relates to tortious acts, suits in 
admiralty, or suits relating to certain mortgage transactions. See id. § 1605. Prior to the enactment 
of the FSIA, the President made grants of sovereign immunity on a case-by-case basis, largely in 
conformity with prevailing international common law. See e.g. Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 
U.S. 578, 586–88 (1943) (noting the courts are required to promptly accept an executive determi-
nation of immunity because such antagonistic jurisdiction is an affront to the dignity of foreign 
nations and may cause significant embarrassment to the executive in conducting foreign relations). 
 77 See infra notes 78–95 and accompanying text. 
 78 See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f (2012) (delineating the content requirements for the Secretary of 
State’s annual report to Congress on terrorist activity and subsequent foreign government respons-
es). 
 79 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM, CHAPTER 3: STATE SPONSORS OF 
TERRORISM OVERVIEW (2015), http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257520.htm [https://perma.cc/
Q8XA-3FYY] [hereinafter STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM OVERVIEW] (describing the rationale 
for designating three foreign nations state sponsors of terror). 
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a foreign nation is a state sponsor of terror and that nation is subsequently 
designated under the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export Control 
Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act.80 This designation, which imposes 
several financial sanctions and economic barriers, may only be rescinded by 
a presidential report to Congress, certifying the foreign state’s change in 
posture.81 
In essence, Congress has delegated authority to the Executive through 
the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export Control Act, and the For-
eign Assistance Act to designate and enforce state sponsor of terror status 
and has created an annual timeline and reporting mechanism.82 This statuto-
ry delegation of power from the legislature to the President is similar to 
those granted to Presidents Clinton and Roosevelt by Congress in Crosby 
and Curtiss-Wright, respectively.83 In both of those cases, as with designat-
ing a state sponsor of terror, the President’s inherent foreign affairs powers 
have been given greater sanction through congressional delegations of au-
thority; thus the President’s actions, at the zenith of executive power, are 
accorded great deference by the courts.84 
                                                                                                                           
 80 State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.
htm [https://perma.cc/GHA2-WTDF] [hereinafter State Sponsors] (detailing the four principal 
types of sanctions that arise from designation as a state sponsor of terror under § 6(j) of the Export 
Administration Act, § 40 of the Arms Control Act, and § 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act). 
 81 See id. (explaining the economic consequences of designation as a state sponsor of terror); 
STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM OVERVIEW, supra note 79. First, the President may submit a 
report to Congress certifying a fundamental change in leadership, support for international terror-
ism, or assurances of such fundamental change. STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM OVERVIEW, 
supra note 79. Second, the President may, giving Congress forty-five days’ notice prior to rescis-
sion, certify that the government in question has not supported international terrorism in the pre-
ceding six months and has provided assurances that the government will not provide future sup-
port to international terrorism. Id. 
 82 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2012) (precluding the prevision of assistance to any country 
the Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism); id. § 2656f (delineating the content requirements for the Secretary of State’s annual 
report to Congress on terrorist activity and subsequent foreign government responses); 22 U.S.C. 
§ 2780 (2012 & Supp. II 2014) (prohibiting the sale of military equipment to nations designated 
by the Secretary of State as having provided support for acts of international terrorism); 50 U.S.C. 
§ 4605(j) (2012) (requiring a validated license prior to the export of any good or technology to a 
country that the Secretary has determined repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
terrorism). 
 83 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 363, 382 (2000) (describing 
scheme enacted by Congress to grant the President broad latitude to develop a comprehensive plan 
for U.S. relations with Burma); U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311–13 (discuss-
ing the joint resolution of Congress and President Roosevelt’s subsequent ban on the sale of arms 
and munitions to Latin American countries engaged in conflict). 
 84 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 382 (describing the scheme enacted by Congress to grant the Pres-
ident broad latitude to develop a comprehensive plan for U.S. relations with Burma); Youngstown, 
343 U.S. at 635–36 (Jackson, J., concurring) (envisioning presidential power as being at its zenith, 
when expressly supported by a congressional grant of authority); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311–
13 (discussing the joint resolution of Congress and President Roosevelt’s subsequent ban on the 
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2. The Tort and State Sponsor of Terrorism Exceptions 
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act contains two exceptions rele-
vant to JASTA: the tort exception and the terrorism exception.85 The former 
includes an exception to foreign sovereign immunity for tortious acts that 
occur on U.S. soil.86 The exception’s original intent largely centered on in-
cidents between U.S. citizens and a foreign national acting as an agent of 
their home country.87 For example, motor vehicle accident involving mem-
bers of the diplomatic community on official business and U.S. citizens fall 
into this category.88 
The Act creates a terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity, 
distinct from the tort exception, permitting suits against foreign govern-
ments involved in terrorist action against U.S. citizens, but only when that 
foreign government has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism.89 
The statutory text suggests that where a foreign nation may be linked 
to an act of terrorism, but has not been designated a state sponsor of terror, a 
civil litigant would be required to rely on a separate statutory exception to 
                                                                                                                           
sale of arms and munitions to Latin American countries engaged in conflict). See generally U.S. 
CONST. art. II (describing the general powers of the executive, particularly with respect to foreign 
affairs). 
 85 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016); 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012) (discussing the 
ability of U.S. citizens to press suits for tortious acts committed against them by foreign states as 
well as for acts of terror supported by a foreign state previously designated a state sponsor of ter-
ror). 
 86 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (discussing the ability of U.S. citizens to press suits for tortious acts 
committed against them by foreign states). The tort exception allows for recovery when “money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of 
property, occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign 
state or of any official or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office 
or employment.” Id. 
 87 See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act: Hearing on H.R. 2040 Before the Sub-
comm. on the Const. and Civil Just. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 27 (2016) 
[hereinafter JASTA Hearing on H.R. 2040] (statement of Brian Egan, Legal Advisor for the U.S. 
Department of State) (describing the principal impetus for the noncommercial tort exception to 
sovereign immunity as traffic accidents). 
 88 See, e.g., Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 171 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding the 
tort exception to the FSIA did not apply to a Saudi Air Force representative at fault for a vehicle 
accident with a U.S. citizen in Mississippi because the foreign national was travelling outside the 
scope of official employment on behalf of the Saudi government); Asociacion de Reclamantes v. 
United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517, 1525 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting, in a decision by then-Judge 
Scalia, the primary purpose of the tort exception as a remedy for traffic accidents). 
 89 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (detailing the additional terrorism exception to foreign sovereign 
immunity); see, e.g., Bluth v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 203 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16–19, 22–26 (D.D.C. 
2016) (awarding damages to an American citizen injured in a Hamas attack after determining the 
court could exercise jurisdiction over Iran, a designated state sponsor of terrorism, under 28 
U.S.C. 1605A’s terrorism exception to the FSIA for the actions of the Ministry of Information and 
Security and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in support of Hamas). 
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press their suit.90 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, howev-
er, in 2008, in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, observed that 
courts are hesitant to shoehorn an action that did not adequately fall within 
the most applicable statutory exception into a different sovereign immunity 
exception.91 Without an express and applicable statutory exception, a claim 
against a foreign nation for its alleged support of terrorist acts occurring in 
the United States could only be prosecuted if that nation had been designat-
ed a state sponsor of terror.92 
3. Congressional Power over Federal Courts 
Congress has broad power to regulate the structure and administration 
of the courts, and significantly, the authority to allocate jurisdiction in the 
federal court system.93 In its 1983 decision in Verlinden B.V. v. Central 
Bank of Nigeria, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, based on Congress’ con-
stitutional authority over foreign commerce and foreign relations, that Con-
gress has an undisputed power to determine whether foreign nations may be 
amenable to suits in the United States.94 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (delineating clearly the requirements of the exception). 
 91 See 538 F.3d 71, 89–90 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing how the requirements for plaintiffs to 
demonstrate an exception to foreign sovereign immunity applies to the case after a defendant has 
shown it is a foreign state, and further discussing the litigant’s inability to make the facts of their 
case fit an exception when the most obviously-applicable exception is unavailable). The court 
noted that permitting an action clearly predicated on a state sponsored terror theory to move for-
ward under the tort exception to foreign sovereign immunity would eviscerate the exception. See 
id. (noting that terrorist acts were concurrently tortious acts, and thus assuming jurisdiction over a 
foreign state for terrorist actions under the tort exception would merge the two exceptions in a 
certain class of cases). Unwilling to allow such manipulation of the FSIA, the court dismissed the 
case. See id. at 75, 89 (dismissing claims against the Kingdom itself, the “Four Princes” personally 
named in the suit, and several Saudi entities alleged to have directed funds that were ultimately 
used by Al Qaeda operatives). 
 92 See id. at 75 (noting very clearly that because the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had not been 
designated a state sponsor of terror, the plaintiffs’ claim did not fall within the § 1605A statutory 
exception to the FSIA). 
 93 See U.S. CONST. arts. I, III (granting Congress that authority to establish courts inferior to 
the Supreme Court and to appropriate funds, but silent on the jurisdiction of inferior courts); see, 
e.g., Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, 2982 (1976) (enacting the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act, thereby directing the jurisdictional limits of the federal courts over foreign nations). See gen-
erally ELIZABETH BAZAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32926, CONGRESSIONAL AUTHOR-
ITY OVER THE FEDERAL COURTS (2005) (describing the array of authorities by which Congress 
may exert influence over the structure and operations of the federal court system and Congress’s 
power to legislatively alter the jurisdiction of the federal court system). 
 94 See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983) (describing con-
gressional power to determine the jurisdictional limits of the federal courts). The Verlinden Court, 
however, did not make clear whether such power was exclusive to Congress alone, and the Court 
noted that, historically, the judiciary has deferred to the executive branch on whether to exercise 
jurisdiction over foreign nations. See id. at 486–90 (explaining the history of the doctrine of for-
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Congress holds clear authority to set the jurisdictional bounds of the 
federal courts, within constitutional limits, but when jurisdiction has in-
volved the narrowly limited issue of foreign sovereign immunity, that power 
has not historically been exclusive.95 
D. The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act 
JASTA broadens the previously-existing state sponsor of terrorism ex-
ception to foreign sovereign immunity, § 1605A, by adding § 1605B, result-
ing in several noteworthy consequences.96 First, § 1605B removes the im-
munity of any nation providing substantial assistance for acts of terrorism 
perpetrated against the United States without regard for an executive desig-
nation as a state sponsor of terrorism.97 
Second, JASTA eliminates any territorial restrictions on a foreign gov-
ernment’s action.98 Regardless of where in the world the foreign govern-
ment’s tortious activity took place, if the action resulted in terrorist acts 
against the United States, the foreign government cannot invoke sovereign 
immunity in a U.S. court.99 
Third, JASTA includes a congressional finding that the decision of the 
U.S. District Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Halberstam v. 
Welch provides the proper legal framework for analyzing a foreign nation’s 
civil liability in a federal aiding and abetting or conspiracy case.100 Finally, 
                                                                                                                           
eign sovereign immunity in the United States and the deference typically afforded the President as 
a result of the broader political considerations of the State Department). 
 95 See id. at 486–90 (describing the history of executive suggestions of immunity). The courts 
may still afford deference to the executive in determinations of foreign sovereign immunity. See 
Samantar v. Yousef, 560 U.S. 305, 311–14 (2010) (failing to clearly delineate the extent to which 
a presidential suggestion of immunity applies in a more recent context); Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 
486–90 (describing the history of executive suggestions of immunity). 
 96 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (detailing the expanded exception for 
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state for international terrorism against the United States). 
 97 Id. Distinct from its jurisdictional component, JASTA also expands civil causes of actions, 
previously created by the Antiterrorism Act; JASTA withdraws sovereign immunity, but the cause 
of action against foreign nations would likely arise under the Antiterrorism Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2333 
(2012 & Supp. IV 2016); see also Bitterly, supra note 4, at 3400 (describing JASTA’s role in 
expanding secondary liability, particularly for banks). 
 98 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (expressly granting jurisdiction regardless of the location of the 
tortious activities supporting acts of terror, when such acts occur in the United States). 
 99 See id.; JASTA Hearing on H.R. 2040, supra note 87, at 24 (statement of Ambassador Anne 
W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs) (describing the impact of 
removing territorial limitations on the exceptions for foreign sovereign immunity, especially the 
potential disruption to relationships with important partners in the global war on terror). 
 100 See Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852, 852–53 (2016) (describing the congressional find-
ings undergirding JASTA); Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing 
civil conspiracy as requiring: an agreement to do an unlawful act or a lawful act in an unlawful 
manner, an overt act in furtherance of the agreement by someone participating in it, and injury 
caused by the act). Halberstam further lists the elements of aiding and abetting as “(1) the party 
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JASTA contains a noteworthy provision allowing the Executive to seek to 
stay a proceeding against a foreign state after immunity has been withdrawn 
under Section 1605B.101 Such a stay may only be granted, however, when the 
Attorney General verifies the Secretary of State is engaged in good faith dis-
cussions with the foreign nation to resolve the claims against that nation.102 
E. Reaction to JASTA 
The legislative override enacting JASTA garnered significant media at-
tention, for reasons ranging from its novelty as the only veto override of the 
Obama Presidency, to its domestic political fallout, and its impact on U.S. 
relations overseas.103 
September 11 families were among the most outspoken in their reaction 
to the measure, many having long sought resolution of their grief through 
legal accountability.104 In November of 2016, just weeks after JASTA’s en-
actment, the daughters of a 9/11 victim filed McCarthy v. Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in the Southern District of New York, relying on 28 U.S.C. section 
                                                                                                                           
the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be 
generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time he provides 
the assistance; and (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal viola-
tion.” 705 F.2d at 487–88. 
 101 See Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852, 854 (describing the scope of executive interven-
tion in JASTA-based proceedings). 
 102 See id. (describing the requirements for the executive to successfully request a stay of 
proceedings against a foreign nation). 
 103 See, e.g., Ted Barrett & Dierde Walsh, Congress Suddenly Has Buyer’s Remorse for Over-
riding Obama’s Veto, CNN (Sept. 29, 2016, 9:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/29/politics/
obama-911-veto-congressional-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/YSU3-5HES] (asking President Obama 
about his response to lone veto override of his presidency and quoting Senator McConnell’s wish that 
the President had expressed the potential downsides of JASTA earlier); Daniel W. Drezner, The 
Unbearable Idiocy of Congress, WASH. POST (Sept. 30, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
posteverything/wp/2016/09/30/the-unbearable-idiocy-of-congress/?utm_term=.62e5024766c6 
[https://perma.cc/U9LC-627P] (discussing the consolidation of foreign affairs power to the execu-
tive and Congress’s failure to adequately handle its constitutional foreign affairs obligations). 
Senators Lindsay Graham and John McCain have spoken jointly on the Senate floor to propose 
amendments to JASTA, calling its modification an issue of “transcendent importance” to the na-
tion. See Sens. Graham and McCain Speak on Senate Floor Regarding JASTA Legislation, LIND-
SEY GRAHAM (Dec. 9, 2016), http://www.lgraham.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/videos?ID=8B17
5428-CBA1-4F95-AD88-9E91B08946C8 [https://perma.cc/2YT6-5Q4L] (describing the need to 
amend the text of JASTA). 
 104 See Counter Terrorism Bill JASTA Becomes Law, PASSJASTA.ORG (Sept. 28, 2016), http://
passjasta.org/2017/10/counter-terrorism-bill-jasta-becomes-law/ [https://perma.cc/VN4N-LVLE] 
(describing the desire of 9/11 families and survivors to find answers regarding the 9/11 attacks 
through the judicial system upon the enactment of JASTA); see also Uphold Veto on 9/11 Lawsuits, 
supra note 10 (recognizing the difficulties of litigating 9/11 cases and calling JASTA a last-ditch 
effort to allow families of 9/11 victims to bring suit against Saudi Arabia). 
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1605B, JASTA’s terrorism exception to sovereign immunity.105 The case has 
been referred to a magistrate judge for pretrial motions and the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia has filed a motion to dismiss.106 
The particular case of Saudi Arabia’s involvement, however, presents a 
unique situation for a President Trump because, as both his decision not to 
include Saudi Arabia in his “travel ban” executive order and President 
Obama’s veto indicate, the American-Saudi relationship is a vital one that 
presidents are loathe to upset.107 The broader policy question, then, is how 
to balance victims’ access to court in terrorism cases against the national 
need for stability in foreign affairs.108 At present, the balance has shifted in 
favor of individual plaintiffs’ use of the courts, rather than national foreign 
affairs interests.109 A judgment against the Kingdom in cases like McCarthy 
may drastically alter the American relationship to Saudi Arabia.110 
Indeed, under the factors laid out in Crosby, the most constitutionally 
significant of the reactions to JASTA are the reactions of foreign govern-
ments because this most directly impacts U.S. foreign policy.111 JASTA was 
called a “breach of Dutch Sovereignty” in a parliamentary motion in the 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Complaint ¶¶ 11–19, McCarthy v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. 1:16-cv-o8884 (S.D.N.Y 
Nov. 15, 2016) (explaining the suit’s reliance on JASTA to support the court’s jurisdiction of the 
matter); see also Jonathan Stempel, Saudi Arabia Faces $6 Billion U.S. Lawsuit by Sept. 11 Insurers, 
REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-saudi-sept11/saudi-arabia-faces-6-
billion-u-s-lawsuit-by-sept-11-insurers-idUSKBN16V1ZP [https://perma.cc/3RVG-VGRW] (de-
scribing the suits, enabled by JASTA of insurers seeking recompense through compensatory damag-
es, as well as triple and punitive damages, all in addition to seven other lawsuits filed on behalf of 
individuals). 
 106 Order of Reference to a Magistrate Judge, McCarthy v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, No. 
1:16-cv-o8884 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2017). 
 107 See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017) (excluding the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia from the modified travel ban); Readout of the President’s Call with King Salman bin 
Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2017/01/29/readout-presidents-call-king-salman-bin-abd-al-aziz-al-saud-saudi-
arabia [https://perma.cc/P97Q-WYE7] [hereinafter Readout of the President’s Call] (affirming the 
longstanding, strategically-important relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and 
committing the respective heads of state to continued cooperation); Veto Message from the Presi-
dent, supra note 13 (describing the principal reasons that President Obama returned S.2040 to 
Congress unsigned).  
 108 See Uphold Veto on 9/11 Lawsuits, supra note 10 (noting that JASTA lawsuits place U.S. 
foreign policy in the hands of litigants rather than, properly, with the President and Secretary of 
State). 
 109 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (liberalizing litigants’ ability to pursue 
claims against foreign governments for support of terrorist acts occurring within the United 
States). 
 110 See Readout of the President’s Call, supra note 107 (affirming the longstanding, strategi-
cally-important relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and committing the 
respective heads of state to continued cooperation). 
 111 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381–82 (2000) (describing three 
factors that courts consider when weighing the degree of obstruction to the conduct of the nation’s 
foreign affairs, including the protests of a foreign state and the likelihood of reciprocity). 
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Netherlands, and Great Britain has expressed concern over their possible 
increase in legal exposure as a result of the passage of JASTA.112 Further, 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was particularly vocal in its opposition to 
JASTA and expended significant resources to lobby against its passage.113 
F. Prudential Standing 
As the reaction to JASTA indicates, the Act invoked noteworthy politi-
cal concerns.114 Such significant political implications are occasionally so 
great that a court may decline to exercise jurisdiction over a particular issue, 
despite the court’s legal ability to hear the case.115 Article III of the Consti-
tution limits courts to hearing only “cases and controversies” and thus 
courts do not offer speculative or advisory opinions.116 Courts may also 
self-impose prudential standing limitations, like an avoidance of political 
questions, to conserve judicial capital and hear only those cases properly 
suited to resolution by the Judiciary, rather than issues best remedied by the 
political branches of government.117 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See JASTA Hearing on H.R. 2040, supra note 87, at 24 (statement of Ambassador Anne 
W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs) (listing specifically the Dutch 
and British concerns). One member of Parliament worried a British failure to stop a terror plot 
executed in the United States might expose the United Kingdom to liability and open up discovery 
to MI5 and MI6 intelligence secrets, causing serious damage to the long-standing “special rela-
tionship” between the United Kingdom and the United States. Tom Tugendhat, Why a US Law to 
Let 9/11 Families Sue Saudi Arabia Is a Threat to Britain and Its Intelligence Agencies, THE TEL-
EGRAPH (June 5, 2016, 7:34 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/06/05/why-a-us-law-to-
let-911-families-sue-saudi-arabia-is-a-threat-to/ [https://perma.cc/2FKT-WDB2]. 
 113 Julie Hirschfield Davis, Fight Between Saudis and 9/11 Families Escalates in Washington, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/us/politics/9-11-saudi-bill-
veto-obama.html [perma.cc/UWM5-6AKW] (describing Saudi Arabia’s efforts to convince Amer-
ican law makers not to legislatively override President Obama’s veto and the Kingdom’s retention 
of lobbying firms in Washington to support the effort). 
 114 See supra notes 103–113 and accompanying text (describing the politically-charged reac-
tion, at home and abroad, to JASTA). 
 115 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210–11 (1962) (embracing the notion that some actions 
by the political branches of government demand a certain degree of finality, and should not be 
reviewed by the courts). 
 116 See U.S. CONST. art. III (creating a limitation on U.S. courts to hear only cases and con-
troversies); Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–50 (2016) (describing the requirements 
of Article III standing); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
73, 78 (2007) (describing the case and controversy requirement as well as the prohibition on advi-
sory opinions). 
 117 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 210 (describing the political question doctrine as principally a sepa-
ration of powers doctrine, to ensure decision-making by the appropriate authority); see also 
Siegel, supra note 116 (describing the separation of powers theory of justiciability, but also noting 
the lack of clear theoretical underpinnings). 
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The Supreme Court’s 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr is the seminal 
ruling in political question doctrine jurisprudence.118 Baker enumerated six 
factors courts should apply when determining whether a political question is 
justiciable: the potential embarrassment from multiple branches of govern-
ment speaking on one issue, the unusual need for unquestioning adherence 
to a previously made political decision, the impossibility of resolving the 
issue without disrespecting a coordinate branch of government, the impos-
sibility of resolving the issue without an initial policy decision, the absence 
of judicially manageable standards to resolve the question, or a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch 
of government.119 
Not all questions with political implications, however, are non-justic-
iable.120 In 2014, the Supreme Court noted in its Lexmark v. Static Control 
Components decision that courts may not avoid hearing cases Congress has 
empowered courts to hear simply because it would be imprudent.121 Courts 
have an affirmative duty to hear cases and resolve disputes.122 Thus, courts 
must carefully balance the Baker factors and perhaps discount the practical 
wisdom of prudence to determine whether a case is justiciable, even one with 
consequences as significant as a terrorism liability suit enabled by JASTA.123 
II. THE EXECUTIVE IS BEST POSITIONED TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS OF A 
FOREIGN STATE’S RESPONSIBILITY FOR TERROR 
JASTA expands opportunities to seek civil relief against foreign na-
tions when that nation’s actions resulted in terrorist acts within the United 
States on or after September 11, 2001.124 Such litigation had previously 
been barred by FSIA’s limited withholding of sovereign immunity in only 
                                                                                                                           
 118 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 369; see also Abebe, supra note 49, at 234 (noting 
that Baker v. Carr elucidated the political question doctrine). 
 119 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (laying out the six “Brennan Factors” for analysis when courts 
determine whether a political question is justiciable). 
 120 See id. at 209 (affirming that the mere fact a suit involves disputes over political rights or 
issues does not necessarily mean the case is non-justiciable). 
 121 See Lexmark Intern, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387–88 
(2014) (holding the role of the courts is not to ask whether they should, as a normative matter, 
hear cases, but whether, as a matter of affirmative empowerment, they must hear a case). 
 122 Id.; see also David E. Marion, Judicial Faithfulness or Wandering Indulgence? Original 
Intentions and the History of Marbury v. Madison, 57 ALABAMA L. REV. 1041, 1062 (2006) (de-
scribing the efforts of several Supreme Court justices to ensure Marbury’s continued value as a 
source of the judiciary’s responsibility to assess the validity of legislative action that affects 
rights). 
 123 See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387–88 (describing the judicial responsibility to hear cases, 
even those with potentially disruptive consequences). 
 124 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (detailing the expanded exception for 
jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state for international terrorism against the United States). 
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those cases where the foreign nation was designated by the executive 
branch as a state sponsor of terror.125 Under the scheme imposed by JASTA, 
a U.S. court could find a foreign nation liable for substantial support of ter-
rorism, even without an executive state sponsor of terror determination.126 
A critical assumption undergirding an analysis of JASTA is the coequal 
status of the branches of the federal government.127 An executive determi-
nation that a nation is a state sponsor of terror should properly be equated to 
a federal court finding of liability for state support of terrorist acts occurring 
in the United States.128 Both instances represent a branch of the U.S. gov-
ernment making a public declaration of a foreign state’s participation in ter-
rorism, even if the procedural consequences (a finding of liability and 
judgment awarded to a private party rather than economic sanctions) are 
distinct.129 Assuredly, the functional impact on the tenor of the relationship 
between the United States and the suspect country declines in a markedly 
similar fashion, even if the nation faces differing consequences as a result of 
which branch makes the finding.130 
Section A of this Part examines executive determinations of state spon-
sors of terror under a Curtiss-Wright theory of executive power.131 Section 
                                                                                                                           
 125 See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012) (detailing the previously-enacted state sponsor of 
terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity). 
 126 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (describing the revocation of the presumption of foreign sovereign 
immunity but making no reference to a Secretary of State determination that a government has 
repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism). 
 127 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962) (affirming the three branches of the 
federal government are coequal and independent, while also recognizing an appropriate degree of 
judicial restraint in political questions); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–30 
(1935) (stressing the fundamental importance of the constitutional structure and its implications 
for the coequality of each of the three departments of the federal government, and recognizing the 
need for each department to be free from coercion or control by the other departments). 
 128 See Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 629–30 (stressing the fundamental importance of the 
constitutional structure and its implications for the coequality of each of the three departments of 
the federal government, creating the implication that a pronouncement from one branch is coequal 
to a pronouncement from another). 
 129 See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333 (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (awarding threefold monetary 
damages plus fees for injuries resulting from an act of international terrorism); 22 U.S.C. § 2371 
(2012) (precluding the provision of assistance to any country that the Secretary of State has de-
termined has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism); 22 U.S.C. § 2780 
(2012 & Supp. II 2014) (prohibiting the sale of military equipment to nations designated by the 
Secretary of State as having provided support for acts of international terrorism); 50 U.S.C. § 4605 
(2012) (requiring a validated license prior to the export of any good or technology to a country the 
Secretary has determined repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism). 
 130 See 162 CONG. REC. S6611–13 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2016) (Senators McCain and Graham 
conducting a colloquy on the Senate floor regarding statements by a number of senior military, 
diplomatic, and political figures on the fallout of JASTA); see also 162 CONG. REC. S7005–08 
(daily ed. Dec. 9, 2016) (Senator Hatch describing the negative public response to JASTA and the 
perception of the possible adverse consequences to relationships abroad). 
 131 See infra notes 133–139 and accompanying text. 
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B evaluates these determinations utilizing the one-voice theory, and, finally, 
Section C details the President’s recognition power.132 
A. Executive Determinations Under a Curtiss-Wright  
Theory of Executive Power 
The high-water mark for executive power analysis is the Supreme 
Court’s 1936 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation decision.133 
Curtiss-Wright embraced the notion, attributed to Justice John Marshall, of 
the President as the “sole organ” of international relations for the United 
States.134 The Curtiss-Wright Court assumed an inherent, extra-textual pow-
er resides with President for the conduct of foreign relations.135 The Court 
also noted a President must be afforded freedom of action that would be 
impermissible domestically, but necessary abroad, because the maintenance 
of international ties and the protection of the United States from serious 
embarrassment are best achieved by a single executive.136 
The President’s decision not to designate a state a sponsor of terror 
may rest on confidential information, made known by the ambassadors, dip-
lomats, and consular officials responsible for carrying out the President’s 
foreign affairs policy.137 Disrupting the President’s ability to exclusively 
make determinations regarding the U.S. government’s belief that a foreign 
nation participated in terrorist activities against the United States places 
decision-making authority in the hands of in a less informed decision mak-
er: the courts.138 Curtiss-Wright dealt with these imbalances of institutional 
competence through great deference to the more competent decision-maker: 
the Executive.139 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See infra notes 140–169 and accompanying text. 
 133 See Fisher, supra note 38, at 145 (describing the impact of the Curtiss-Wright decision in 
ongoing judicial understandings of inherent, extra-constitutional executive power). 
 134 See id; see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936) 
(describing the plenary and exclusive power of the President in foreign affairs). Congress granted 
the President discretion to impose an embargo on arms shipments to select South American coun-
tries; the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation was charged with violating that embargo. Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. at 311. 
 135 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–20 (discussing the vesting of the executive with pow-
er not express in the Constitution). 
 136 See id. (describing the plenary and exclusive power of the President in foreign affairs). 
 137 See id. (describing the resources that may be uniquely available to the executive at critical 
decision points). But see James R. Ferguson, Government Secrecy After the Cold War: The Role of 
Congress, 34 B.C. L. REV. 451, 468 (1993) (explaining, in the cold war context, the constitutional 
separation of powers perils of allowing the executive to operate with secrecy). 
supra 
 139 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–23 (finding a plenary executive power in foreign 
relations). Curtiss-Wright’s “sole organ” language is an important landmark for executive power in 
international relations and evaluating the inherent, extra-textual authorities of the Office of the Presi-
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B. Executive Determinations Under the One-Voice Theory 
The Supreme Court decision in Curtiss-Wright was heavily focused on 
the source of presidential power in foreign affairs.140 There is a distinct no-
tion, however, that regardless of the source of power to conduct foreign af-
fairs, the United States should speak with one voice.141 Where the “sole or-
gan” language places the President at the focal point of American foreign 
relations, the one-voice theory is more focused on the consistency of the 
American message, rather than the identity of the speaker.142 In concert, 
these two understandings of American foreign relations suggest not only 
that America must speak with one voice, but that voice should be the Ex-
ecutive’s alone.143 
The one-voice theory focuses on ensuring consistency in the American 
message and predictability in the conduct of foreign affairs, which is best 
espoused in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council.144 The Crosby 
Court, reiterating prior precedent, noted three principal considerations for 
determining if a legislative action disrupted the ability of the nation to speak 
with one voice: formal diplomatic protest, the consistent representations of 
the executive, and the risk of foreign retaliation.145 
                                                                                                                           
dent. See Fisher, supra note 38, at 139–40 (describing contemporary legal arguments relying upon 
the inherent executive power found in Curtiss-Wright). 
 140 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–23 (granting great deference to the executive in for-
eign affairs). 
 141 See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381–82 (2000) (finding the 
ability of the President to speak with one voice for the nation, without exception, is vital to the 
presentation of a coherent American position in the best interest of the entire national economy). 
 142 See id. (stressing speaking with one voice, albeit in the context of the executive for the 
particular case at bar); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–23 (discussing inherent and exclusive 
presidential authority). 
 143 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381–82 (stressing speaking with one voice, albeit in the context of 
the executive for the particular case at bar); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–323 (discussing in-
herent and exclusive presidential authority). 
 144 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381–82 (finding the ability of the President to speak with one 
voice for the nation, without exception, is vital to the presentation of a coherent American position 
in the best interest of the entire national economy). Although the “sole organ” language of Curtiss-
Wright admittedly does speak to a consistent American message abroad, the one-voice theory is more 
clearly discussed in Crosby. Compare Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381–82 (finding the ability of the Presi-
dent to speak with one voice for the nation is central to effective execution of foreign policy), with 
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319–23 (finding a plenary executive power in foreign relations). 
 145 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381–82 (describing three factors that courts consider when weigh-
ing the degree of obstruction to the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs). In Crosby, the Su-
preme Court evaluated a Massachusetts law that conflicted with federal law respecting trade and 
the broader relationship between the United States and Burma. See id. at 382. Congress had ex-
pressly granted the President sweeping authority to develop a comprehensive scheme for enhanc-
ing American-Burmese relations, which was hindered by the legislative actions of an individual 
state. Id. 
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JASTA is an obstacle to diplomatic objectives because it has the poten-
tial to create all three of the factors noted by the Crosby Court.146 The pro-
tests of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and others have been signifi-
cant.147 Additionally, the European Union memorialized its concerns in a 
diplomatic démarche, and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia warned it would 
consider removing approximately $750 billion in assets from the United 
States if JASTA exposed the Kingdom to legal liability.148 Second, the 
Obama administration consistently represented, particularly in the Presi-
dent’s veto memorandum, its objections to the foreign relations obstacles 
JASTA might impose.149 Although it remains unclear to what extent, if any, 
the Trump administration objects to JASTA, America’s special relationship 
with the United Kingdom and critical ties to Saudi Arabia may give the ad-
ministration pause in fully embracing JASTA.150 Lastly, JASTA may expose 
the United States to reciprocal jurisdiction; that is, other nations may limit 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See id. at 382 (explaining the factors for determining under what circumstances legislative 
action burdens the conduct of foreign affairs). 
 147 See JASTA Hearing on H.R. 2040, supra note 87, at 24 (statement of Ambassador Anne 
W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs) (describing the reactions of 
numerous European and Middle East governments that objected to JASTA, and the subsequent 
strain in foreign relations). 
 148 See Mark Mazzetti, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Fallout if Congress Passes 9/11 Bill, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-
warns-ofeconomic-fallout-if-congress-passes-9-11-bill.html?_r=0 [perma.cc/78TH-UMXW] (detail-
ing the message from the Saudi Foreign Minister, delivered personally to American lawmakers, 
regarding the potential sale of Saudi held treasury securities and other assets); Kristina Wong, EU 
Expresses Concern over 9/11 Bill, THE HILL (Sept. 21 2016, 1:56 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/
defense/297054-eu-expresses-concern-over-9-11-bill [https://perma.cc/R5WA-ZFJ2] (describing 
the contents of the European Union’s diplomatic communication to Washington, which comment-
ed on JASTA’s departure from prevailing sovereign immunity norms); see also Démarche, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining démarche as “an oral or written diplomatic 
statement, esp. one containing a demand, offer, protest, threat, or the like”). 
 149 See Veto Message from the President, supra note 13 (describing the principal reasons 
President Obama returned S.2040 to Congress unsigned). 
 150 See, e.g., President Trump and Prime Minister May’s Opening Remarks, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 
27, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/27/president-trump-and-prime-
minister-mays-opening-remarks [https://perma.cc/SW9A-LAYA] (pledging President Trump’s last-
ing support to the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom at a 
joint press conference with Prime Minister May during her visit to the White House); Readout of 
the President’s Call, supra note 107 (affirming the longstanding, strategically important relation-
ship between the United States and Saudi Arabia, and committing the respective heads of state to 
continued cooperation); see also Rosalind Helderman, Countries Where Trump Does Business Are 
not Hit by New Travel Restrictions, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/countries-where-trump-does-business-are-not-hit-by-new-travel-restrictions/2017/01/
28/dd40535a-e56b-11e6-a453-19ec4b3d09ba_story.html?utm_term=.ef036a5462ac [https://perma.
cc/9G9E-L99J] (detailing that the Trump Organization had expressed interest in doing business in 
the Kingdom not long before President Trump excluded Saudi Arabia, where fifteen of the nine-
teen 9/11 hijackers originated, from his travel ban). Notably, however, prior to the election, the 
company cancelled several limited liability incorporations that had laid initial groundwork for 
building a hotel in Saudi Arabia. Helderman, supra. 
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the ability of the United States to claim sovereign immunity in foreign 
courts, imperiling national assets and personnel abroad, and opening the 
country to embarrassing and costly litigation.151 
Although Crosby dealt more specifically with the preemption of a state 
statute relating to foreign affairs, the Crosby factors for analyzing whether a 
legislative action disrupts the ability of the nation to speak with one voice 
apply to JASTA.152 Here, the federal statute at issue impairs the authority 
delegated to the President through the Export Administration Act, the Arms 
Export Control Act, and the Foreign Assistance Act to exclusively make 
determinations regarding a foreign nation’s responsibility for acts of ter-
ror.153 The Executive is hampered by the possibility that the judiciary may 
find a foreign nation provided substantial support for acts of terrorism, re-
gardless of a president’s unwillingness to make such a determination.154 The 
potential for a disjointed message from the executive and the judiciary is 
high, and runs contrary to the predictability and consistency in foreign af-
fairs, which the one-voice theory protects.155 
Despite the critiques of the one-voice theory, its tenets make clear that 
Congress, through JASTA, has created obstacles to the consistent and pre-
dictable conduct of American foreign policy, interfering with a function 
more properly in the province of the Executive.156 
C. Executive Recognition Power Under Zifotovsky 
In American foreign relations, the recognition power, or the acknowl-
edgement of a particular entity’s statehood and territorial boundaries, is 
                                                                                                                           
 151 See Veto Message from the President, supra note 13 (describing the risks of reciprocal 
jurisdiction). 
 152 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381–82 (detailing the courts’ considerations for evaluating obsta-
cles to the execution of foreign affairs). 
 153 See David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Hold on JASTA Minute!, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 20, 
2016, 7:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hold-on-jasta-minute-1480551317?mod=rss_opinion_
main [https://perma.cc/H255-EJJA] (describing the impropriety of Congress’s impairment of the 
President’s responsibility for designating state sponsors of terror). 
 154 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (detailing the expanded exception for juris-
dictional immunity of a foreign state for international terrorism against the United States, giving 
room for the courts to adjudicate the liability of a foreign nation without regard for the Secretary of 
State determination that the foreign state provided repeated support for acts of terrorism). 
 155 See id. (creating the possibility of discordant messages in U.S. foreign policy); Crosby, 
530 U.S. at 381–82 (describing how the state’s message may obscure that of the President); 
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (describing the embarrassment that may result from the nation’s 
failure to speak with a unified message). 
 156 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381–82 (describing the significance of the United States speaking 
to foreign nations with a unified message and the factors courts evaluate when determining wheth-
er that ability has been burdened); Moore, supra note 44 (discussing the history of the one-voice 
doctrine and arguing the doctrine is divorced from practical application, but also noting the doc-
trine has received little scholarly attention). 
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rooted in the Reception Clause of Article II, which empowers the President 
to receive ambassadors and other diplomats.157 Recognition is an endorse-
ment that a particular regime is the legitimate government of a foreign na-
tion.158 As Zivotofsky evinced, the Reception Clause and recognition power 
have been long considered the exclusive prerogative of the Executive.159 
Under an expanded understanding of the recognition power, JASTA may 
prevent the President from exclusively determining the manner in which the 
United States recognizes a foreign nation: as a sponsor of terror, or not—a 
question directly tied to a regime’s legitimacy in the international order.160 
The act of receiving a foreign envoy is a proxy for recognition, because 
the reception is a tacit endorsement of the legitimacy of the envoy’s home 
government.161 Thus, recognition, reception, and regular diplomatic relations 
are all closely linked.162 Recognition is thought of as binary in nature: either 
the President recognizes a foreign government or does not.163 This binary 
understanding of recognition is limiting to both foreign policy and the ability 
to qualify recognition.164 The President should be empowered to find that a 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See U.S. CONST. art. II (stating that the President shall receive ambassadors and other 
public ministers); Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084–85 (2015) (describing the relation-
ship between reception and recognition). 
 158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 
cmt. a, at 84 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) (defining recognition). 
 159 See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084–85 (discussing the legal consequences of recognition 
when Congress enacted a law on consular actions that might result in listing Israel, rather than 
Jerusalem, as a citizen’s birthplace, in direct contradiction to the foreign relations stance promul-
gated by the executive). This authority could be critical as the Trump administration considers how 
it will move forward with the “One China” policy and complexities related to the recognition of 
Taiwan. See e.g., Trump Says U.S. Not Necessarily Bound by ‘One China’ Policy, REUTERS (Dec. 
12, 2016, 3:21 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-china-idUSKBN1400TY [https://
perma.cc/S4XY-B92H] (describing the possibility of recognition for Taiwan if China is unwilling to 
craft new trade agreements). Even if the Trump administration’s stance is at odds with congressional 
preferences, the President’s exclusive recognition power will likely prevail. See Zifotovsky, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2086 (acknowledging that recognition is a topic on which the nation is best served by speak-
ing with one voice and by the President’s unilateral authority to affect recognition). 
 160 See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (discussing the legal consequences of recognition). 
 161 See id. at 2084–85 (discussing the legal consequences of recognition); see also Jean Gal-
braith, Zivotofsky v. Kerry and the Balance of Power, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 16, 20 (2015) (de-
scribing the Court’s theory of recognition in Zivotofsky as one rooted in the Constitution, historical 
practice, and international law). 
 162 See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (describing the relationships between these diplomatic 
functions); see also Harlan Grant Cohen, Zivotofsky II’s Two Visions for Foreign Relations Law, 
109 AJIL UNBOUND 10, 11 (2016) (noting that sending and receiving ambassadors, negotiating 
treaties, and opening diplomatic channels are all linked through the recognition power, and are all 
“dependent on Presidential power”). 
 163 See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (declining to describe recognition in terms of gradation, 
but instead, describing it only in terms of whether or not such an act has been completed, and once 
completed, not to be contradicted by congressional action). 
 164 See Cohen, supra note 162, at 12 (describing the logical inferences, functionalist consider-
ations, common sense, and necessity imbued in Justice Kennedy’s decision in Zivotofsky). 
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regime is the actual leadership of a foreign nation, but choose to qualify 
recognition or question the legitimacy of the regime’s leadership.165 
This is particularly true in cases of state sponsors of terror.166 Indeed, it 
has often been the case that a recognized government, once determined by 
the Executive to be a state sponsor of terror, is no longer received in the 
United States, and ceases to receive American diplomats.167 The breakdown 
of normal diplomatic relations and reception is often the consequence of a 
determination that a foreign state has repeatedly supported acts of interna-
tional terror.168 The President should be empowered, because of the authori-
ty that flows from the reception power in Article II, to qualify the United 
States’ belief in the legitimacy of a foreign regime on the basis of that re-
gime’s relationship with international terror.169 
III. APPLICATION OF THE CHADHA TEST FOR SEPARATION OF POWERS 
VIOLATIONS AND POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR VIOLATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
The perils of JASTA’s removal of the President’s exclusive power to de-
cide for the United States whether a foreign nation bears responsibility for 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See id. (describing the logical inferences, functionalist considerations, common sense, and 
necessity imbued in Justice Kennedy’s decision in Zivotofsky). But see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. a, at 84 (AM. LAW. INST. 1987) 
(defining recognition more narrowly). 
 166 See State Sponsors, supra note 80 (detailing the dates on which Iran, Sudan, and Libya, the 
currently-designated state sponsors of terror, were designated as such); A Guide to the United 
States’ Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Iran, U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE: OFF. OF HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/countries/iran [https://perma.cc/
4N9L-BCAT] [hereinafter Iran Guide] (describing the severing of diplomatic relations with Iran); 
A Guide to the United States’ Recognition, Diplomatic, and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 
1776: Libya, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, https://history.state.gov/countries/
libya [https://perma.cc/K64J-G6ME] [hereinafter Libya Guide] (describing the breakdown of 
formal diplomatic relations with Libya); A Guide to the United States’ Recognition, Diplomatic, 
and Consular Relations, by Country, Since 1776: Sudan, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: OFF. OF HISTORI-
AN, https://history.state.gov/countries/sudan [https://perma.cc/ZAM6-T6D6] [hereinafter Sudan 
Guide] (describing the breakdown of formal diplomatic relations with Sudan). 
 167 See Iran Guide, supra note 166 (noting that diplomatic ties with the United States have 
remained severed since the hostage crisis in 1980); Libya Guide, supra note 166 (describing the 
recall of diplomats and U.S. embassy closure in 1980, the year after Libya was designated a state 
sponsor of terror); Sudan Guide, supra note 166 (describing the repeated severing and re-
establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States). 
 168 See Iran Guide, supra note 166 (noting diplomatic ties with the United States have re-
mained severed since the hostage crisis in 1980); Libya Guide, supra note 166 (describing the 
recall of diplomats and U.S. embassy closure in 1980, the year after Libya was designated a state 
sponsor of terror); Sudan Guide, supra note 166 (describing the repeated severing and re-
establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States). 
 169 See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (acknowledging that recognition is a topic on which the 
nation is best served by speaking with one voice and the President’s unilateral authority to affect 
recognition). 
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terrorist acts seem apparent under several theoretical frameworks.170 Whether 
the Act is unconstitutional, in addition to being unwise, is a larger question 
that remains open.171 Section A of this Part applies constitutional separation 
of powers analysis to JASTA.172 Section B weighs whether JASTA’s execu-
tive intervention provision may save the constitutionality of the Act.173 Lastly, 
Section C addresses possible remedies and the future of JASTA.174 
A. Evaluating the Constitutionality of JASTA 
The effect of JASTA, whether viewed as a disruption of the inherent, 
extra-textual foreign affairs power of the President, a divergence from the 
one-voice theory, or an infringement on the President’s recognition power, 
should still be measured against the two-prong framework for analyzing 
violations of the constitutional separation of powers principle espoused in 
Justice Powell’s 1983 concurrence in Chadha.175 The dispositive questions 
under Chadha are whether JASTA impermissibly interferes with the execu-
tive’s ability to perform constitutionally assigned functions or whether 
JASTA allows the judiciary to assume a function more properly entrusted to 
the Executive.176 
JASTA allows the Judiciary to determine the American stance on a for-
eign nation’s responsibility for terror—a function more properly entrusted to 
the President.177 Through the Export Administration Act, the Arms Export 
                                                                                                                           
 170 See; Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015) (acknowledging that recognition is 
a topic on which the nation is best served by speaking with one voice and the President’s unilat-
eral authority to affect recognition); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381–82 
(2000) (stressing the significance of the nation speaking with one voice); United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–23 (1936) (discussing inherent and exclusive presidential 
authority). 
 171 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (creating two cate-
gories of actions that may violate the separation of powers doctrine: impermissible interference in 
the performance of a function constitutionally assigned to a coordinate branch of government, or 
assumption of a function more properly entrusted to another branch). 
 172 See infra notes 175–196 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra notes 197–204 and accompanying text. 
 174 See infra notes 205–219 and accompanying text. 
 175 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring) (creating two categories of actions 
that may violate the separation of powers doctrine: either the impermissible interference with 
another branch’s performance of constitutionally assigned functions or the assumption of a func-
tion more properly entrusted to another branch); see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2559, 
2593 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Chadha is illustrative of the Court’s vital function 
of policing the enduring structure of constitutional government); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20 at 
369 (describing the significance of the Chadha decision in separation of powers jurisprudence); 
Metzger, supra note 68, at 1636 (describing Chadha, like Youngstown, as a fabled separation of 
powers case). 
 176 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 177 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (granting federal courts jurisdiction to 
hear cases against foreign nations for substantial support of international terrorism); Chadha, 462 
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Control Act, the Foreign Assistance Act, and the Secretary of State’s annual 
reporting requirements to Congress, the Legislature has properly entrusted 
this function to the Executive.178 More fundamentally, the President’s consti-
tutional recognition and other foreign affairs authorities suggest a textually 
demonstrable rationale for entrusting this function to the President.179 
The determination of a foreign powers’ responsibility for terrorist acts 
more properly belongs with the Executive because the unity of the Execu-
tive, unlike the diversity of individual state interests represented by legisla-
tors, is a more apt structure for unity of message to foreign nations.180 
JASTA reduces unity within the federal government’s message by allowing 
separate branches to dictate the United States’ views of a foreign state’s re-
sponsibility for terrorism.181 Indeed, JASTA satisfies all three of the Crosby 
factors used by the courts to identify when legislative action disrupts the 
ability of the nation to speak with one voice.182 JASTA creates multiple or-
gans for the transmission of America’s message, rather than a unified voice, 
by allowing private citizens to have their cases adjudicated in the courts.183 
The mismanagement of the broader American message could result in 
the very embarrassment the Curtiss-Wright Court warned against, should 
the Executive and the Judiciary find themselves at odds over the American 
posture toward a foreign nation’s responsibility for terrorist acts.184 Entrust-
ing the President to determine the American position on a foreign nation’s 
responsibility for terrorism places the decision with the most informed deci-
sion maker, one with access to confidential information, and allows for much 
                                                                                                                           
U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Rivkin & Casey, supra note 153 (describing the 
impropriety of federal courts determining whether a foreign state has intentionally sponsored acts 
of terror, in place of the President). 
 178 See 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2012) (precluding the provision of assistance to any country the 
Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terror-
ism); id. § 2656f (delineating the content requirements for the Secretary of State’s annual report to 
Congress on terrorist activity and subsequent foreign government responses); id. § 2780 (2012 & 
Supp. II 2014) (prohibiting the sale of military equipment to nations designated by the Secretary 
of State as having provided support for acts of international terrorism); 50 U.S.C. § 4605 (2012) 
(requiring a validated license prior to the export of any good or technology to a country the Secre-
tary has determined repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism). 
 179 See U.S. CONST. art. II (describing the President’s authority to receive ambassadors, ap-
point public ministers, make treaties, and act as commander in chief of the nation’s armed forces). 
 180 See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2086 (describing the structural unity of the executive, in con-
trast to the legislature). 
 181 See id. (discussing the structural unity of the executive). 
 182 See Crosby, 530 U.S. at 381–82 (describing three factors that courts consider when weigh-
ing the degree of obstruction to the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs). 
 183 See Uphold Veto on 9/11 Lawsuits, supra note 10 (noting that JASTA lawsuits place U.S. 
foreign policy in the hands of litigants rather than, properly, with the President and Secretary of 
State). 
 184 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (explaining the perils of the embarrassment that may 
result from conflicting pronouncements from various elements of government). 
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broader consideration of the United States’ geopolitical relationship with the 
foreign nation.185 In determining liability, no court may consider information 
outside the case at bar, such as international cooperation agreements, trade 
balances, American military bases abroad, or a foreign nation’s role in re-
gional politics.186 Thus, determining whether the United States makes a 
public declaration that a foreign government sponsors international terror-
ism is most properly entrusted to the executive, regardless of the facts of 
one particular case, because the national stakes are so high.187 
Further, JASTA interferes with the reception and recognition powers of 
the President, which are exclusively executive powers.188 The Executive’s 
ability to determine the manner in which a foreign nation is recognized 
should also be exclusive, and JASTA impermissibly grants the Judiciary 
ability to shade the manner in which the United States recognizes a foreign 
nation’s relationship with terrorism.189 Concededly, it can be argued that 
although the President has exclusive and unreviewable power to recognize 
foreign sovereigns, the longer course of American diplomatic relations with 
a recognized country relies on congressional action and constitutional au-
thorities.190 A president’s ability to recognize a foreign nation, with the 
qualification the state is a sponsor of terror, is vital to conduct of American 
foreign relations.191 Recognition, properly viewed as a malleable process, 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See id. (describing how the President may rely on confidential information and infor-
mation not available to others in decision-making). 
 186 See FED. R. EVID. 401–403 (defining “relevant evidence” and limiting federal courts to 
admitting only relevant evidence during proceedings). 
 187 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (describing the embarrassment that may result from the 
nation’s failure to speak with a unified message). 
 188 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (granting jurisdiction to the courts to hear 
a wider swath of cases involving the responsibility of a foreign nation for acts of terror); Zifotov-
sky, 135 S. Ct. at 2080–81 (describing the exclusivity of recognition and reception for the Presi-
dent); Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (recognizing how little action the judiciary may 
take with respect to a foreign nation until executive recognition). 
 189 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (granting jurisdiction to the courts to hear a wider swath of cases 
involving the responsibility of a foreign nation for acts of terror); Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2085 
(holding that recognition has traditionally been exclusively the province of the President). This is 
the weakest of the separation of powers arguments against JASTA because it rests upon an admittedly 
expanded conceptualization of the reception and recognition powers, and relies on those powers’ 
inherent link to the normal conduct of diplomatic relations. See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090 (de-
scribing traditional notions of the recognition power to consist only of the executive’s ability to 
recognize, or not recognize, a foreign nation and Congress’s subsequent role in determining fur-
ther foreign affairs policy decisions with respect to the foreign nation). 
 190 See Zifotovsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090 (describing traditional notions of the recognition power 
to consist only of the executive’s ability to recognize, or not recognize, a foreign nation and Con-
gress’ subsequent role in determining further foreign affairs policy decisions with respect to the 
foreign nation). 
 191 See id. (discussing the legal consequences of recognition). 
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with the qualification that government is a state sponsor of terror, is a dis-
tinctly executive function.192 
As a consequence, there is a function more properly entrusted to the 
President carried out by the Judiciary, a violation of the second prong of 
Justice Powell’s Chadha test for separation of powers violations.193 The 
statutes empowering the President to designate and sanction state sponsors 
of terror, coupled with the executive’s inherent constitutional foreign affairs 
powers, properly entrust determinations of a foreign state’s responsibility 
for terrorist acts to the President.194 JASTA allows the Judiciary to assume 
this function.195 Thus, JASTA violates the separation of powers doctrine and 
is therefore unconstitutional.196 
B. Executive Intervention Provisions Fail to Satisfy  
Constitutional Demands 
JASTA does contain a provision to allow the executive to stay a pro-
ceeding against a foreign state after immunity has been withdrawn under 
§ 1605B.197 Such a stay, however, may only be granted when the Attorney 
General verifies that the Secretary of State is engaged in good faith discus-
sions with the foreign nation to resolve the pending claims against it.198 
This concession applies only to a narrow class of cases: those where 
the Executive is engaged in good faith negotiations to resolve the claim.199 
A broad array of possible scenarios would not be included in this safeguard, 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See id. 
 193 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (granting jurisdiction to courts to determine a foreign nation’s 
responsibility for acts of terror irrespective of whether the nation has been designated a state spon-
sor of terror); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (creating two 
categories of actions that may violate the separation of powers doctrine). 
 194 See U.S. CONST. art. II (detailing the President’s powers as Commander in Chief, and to 
appoint and receive ambassadors); 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (2012) (precluding the provision of assis-
tance to any country that the Secretary of State has determined has repeatedly provided support for 
acts of international terrorism); id. § 2656f (delineating the content requirements for the Secretary 
of State’s annual report to Congress on terrorist activity and subsequent foreign government re-
sponses); 22 U.S.C. § 2780 (2012 & Supp. II 2014) (prohibiting the sale of military equipment to 
nations designated by the Secretary of State as having provided support for acts of international 
terrorism); 50 U.S.C. § 4605 (2012) (requiring a validated license prior to the export of any good 
or technology to a country the Secretary has determined has repeatedly provided support for acts 
of international terrorism). 
 195 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (detailing the expanded exception for jurisdictional immunity of a 
foreign state for international terrorism against the United States). 
 196 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring); Rivkin & Casey, supra note 153 
(describing the unconstitutionality of JASTA). 
 197 See Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852, 854 (2016) (creating an opportunity for executive 
intervention in § 5). 
 198 See id. (describing the necessary preconditions to obtain a stay of proceedings). 
 199 See id. (creating an opportunity for executive intervention in § 5). 
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including cases where the Executive wished to quash a suit, but was not 
actively negotiating a resolution.200 JASTA’s executive intervention provi-
sion fails to bring the Act into alignment with constitutional separation of 
powers principles because the provision merely creates a slight narrowing 
of the circumstances in which the Judiciary may perform a function more 
properly entrusted to the executive.201 In essence, JASTA would require the 
Executive to negotiate a settlement agreement on the plaintiffs’ behalf to 
prevent the negative consequences of a judicial finding that a foreign sover-
eign was responsible for international terrorism.202 Congress’ statutory con-
cession to the Executive, then, is insufficient to save the Act.203 
Even with the provision for executive intervention, Congress, through 
JASTA, permits the courts to perform a function more properly entrusted to 
the executive, a violation of the constitutional separation of powers doc-
trine.204 
C. Remedy 
The constitutional tension JASTA creates may be remedied through lit-
igation, through the judiciary’s application of the doctrine of prudential 
standing, or in the Legislature.205 
Senators Lindsey Graham, Orrin Hatch, and John McCain have been 
outspoken in their desire to amend JASTA, and House leadership has con-
templated altering the law.206 Such efforts, though, may be met with consid-
                                                                                                                           
 200 See id. (describing the circumstances in which the executive may seek a stay of proceed-
ings against a foreign nation, but failing to address scenarios falling outside the prescribed condi-
tions). 
 201 See id. (detailing the narrow class of instances in which the executive may seek a stay of 
proceedings against a foreign nation); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963 (1983) (Powell, J., con-
curring) (creating two categories of actions that may violate the separation of powers doctrine). 
 202 See Pub. L. No. 114-222, 130 Stat. 852, 854 (creating an opportunity for executive inter-
vention in § 5 which may only be exercised when the Secretary of State is actively engaged in 
good faith negotiations to resolve the claims against the foreign state). 
 203 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 963 (Powell, J., concurring) (depicting two forms of separation of 
powers violations, including assumption of a function more properly entrusted to a coordinate 
branch of government, which JASTA violates because its provision for executive intervention is 
too narrow to actually preclude the courts from acting in a function more properly entrusted to the 
executive). 
 204 See id. (creating two categories of actions that may violate the separation of powers doc-
trine). 
 205 See, e.g., Barrett & Walsh, supra note 103 (discussing Congress’s dissatisfaction with 
JASTA in the immediate aftermath of its legislative veto override). 
 206 See id. (discussing Leader McConnell’s disappointment with the steps leading up to 
JASTA’s enactment and Speaker Ryan’s statement on the need for a legislative fix in order to 
protect U.S. service members abroad); see also 162 CONG. REC. S6611 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2016) 
(Senators McCain and Graham conducting a colloquy on the Senate floor regarding the need to 
legislatively amend JASTA, particularly in the wake of statements by a number of senior military, 
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erable opposition.207 JASTA, in its current form, garnered significant levels 
of support in both chambers of Congress and may very well have the sup-
port of the White House.208 During his Senate confirmation hearing, Secre-
tary of State Rex Tillerson testified to his belief that nations who aid and 
abet terror should be held accountable.209 Furthermore, President Trump 
may be prepared to cede this element of executive foreign affairs power, 
based on his campaign statements criticizing President Obama’s JASTA 
veto.210 
If, however, Congress does not repeal or alter JASTA in such a way that 
ends the usurpation of a function more properly entrusted to the President, a 
nation amenable to suit under JASTA may choose to litigate JASTA’s consti-
tutionality.211 To protect the executive power improperly infringed upon by 
JASTA, a litigant must bring an action to challenge the constitutionality of the 
Act on its face, or as applied.212 The litigant must satisfy both Article III and 
prudential standing considerations, meaning the litigant must demonstrate 
harm, causation, and redressability, as well as demonstrating the litigant com-
ports with the typical prudential considerations applied prior to hearing a con-
troversy.213 
                                                                                                                           
diplomatic, and political figures); 162 CONG. REC. S7005 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2016) (Senator Hatch 
describing the negative public response to JASTA and the need to alter the law). 
 207 See Schumer & Cornyn, supra note 9 (discussing the broad bipartisan support for JASTA 
in Congress). 
 208 See id. (discussing the broad bipartisan support for JASTA in Congress); Donald J. Trump 
Statement on Obama’s Veto of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, DONALD J. TRUMP (Sept. 
23, 2016), https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-president-
obamas-veto-of-the-justice-against-s [https://web.archive.org/web/20170429201958/https://www.
donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-statement-on-president-obamas-veto-of-the-justice-
against-s] [hereinafter Donald J. Trump Statement] (releasing then-candidate Donald Trump’s 
response to President Barack Obama’s veto). 
 209 Secretary of State Designate Rex Tillerson Senate Confirmation Hearing Opening State-
ment, SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 11, 2017), http://www.foreign.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/011117_Tillerson_Opening_Statement.pdf (affirming the Secretary’s belief in the 
need for accountable for nations supporting terrorism). 
 210 See Donald J. Trump Statement, supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 211 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–178 (1803) (determining that it is 
the role of the courts to determine the constitutionality of the law); 162 CONG. REC. S6611 (daily 
ed. Nov. 30, 2016) (Senators McCain and Graham conducting a colloquy on the Senate floor re-
garding the need to legislatively amend JASTA, particularly in the wake of statements made by a 
number of senior military, diplomatic, and political figures); 162 CONG. REC. S7005 (daily ed. 
Dec. 9, 2016) (Senator Hatch describing the negative public response to JASTA and the need to 
alter the law). 
 212 See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 243 (database updated Sept. 2017) (describing the 
differing methods of challenging a statute’s constitutionality). 
 213 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547–50 (2016) (clarifying the “injury in fact” 
element of standing); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (describing the 
three prongs of Article III standing); Baker v. Carr, 396 U.S. 186, 214 (1962) (describing pruden-
tial standing and the factors courts weigh when determining whether a controversy presents a non-
justiciable political question). 
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An as-applied challenge would most likely arise in cases where a for-
eign nation was unable to claim sovereign immunity as a result of § 1605B 
and was forced to defend a claim of supporting terror in the federal 
courts.214 Only after successfully demonstrating Article III standing as a 
result of being forced to defend the claim could a litigant seek judicial re-
view of the constitutionality of JASTA, and ask a court to find the law inva-
lid for violating the separation of powers doctrine.215 
An alternative judicial remedy for the constitutional implications of 
JASTA may be the invocation of the political question doctrine and an ex-
amination of the justiciability of cases like McCarthy.216 JASTA likely satis-
fies one or more of the six political question doctrine factors detailed by 
Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, particularly the potential for embarrass-
ment arising from multiple branches of government speaking on a single 
question, namely whether a foreign state bears responsibility for acts of in-
ternational terrorism.217 Indeed, in its ruling in Schneider v. Kissinger, the 
D.C. Circuit determined that the children of a Chilean general killed as a 
result of decisions by U.S. policy makers to support a 1970 Chilean coup 
had not presented a justiciable question because the political, military, and 
foreign affairs implications of the general’s death were not the province of 
the court.218 Similarly, the political, military, and foreign affairs implica-
tions of finding a foreign state supported acts of terror may not properly be 
the province of the Judiciary, and are best left to the Executive, but such 
judicial action is difficult to predict.219 
                                                                                                                           
 214 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605B (2012 & Supp. IV 2016) (expanding the terrorism exception to 
sovereign immunity to include nations not designated a state sponsor of terror). 
 215 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–50 (clarifying the “injury in fact” element of standing); 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61 (describing the three prongs of Article III standing); see also 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1605B (detailing the expanded exception for jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state for inter-
national terrorism against the United States). 
 216 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 216 (laying out the six “Brennan Factors” for analysis when courts 
determine whether a political question is justiciable); Complaint ¶¶ 11–19, McCarthy v. Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia, No. 1:16-cv-o8884 (S.D.N.Y Nov. 15, 2016) (explaining, in a suit filed against 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by the daughters of a 9/11victim, the suit’s reliance on JASTA to 
support the court’s jurisdiction in the matter). 
 217 See 369 U.S. at 216 (describing the Baker factors for determining whether a case presents 
a non-justiciable political question). 
 218 See 412 F.3d 190, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that, in the context of national security, it 
is not the courts’ place to second-guess expert judgments made by the executive branch in keeping 
with the executive’s constitutionally assigned functions). 
 219 See id.; see also El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. v. United States, 607 F. 3d 836, 842–43 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (rejecting plaintiff’s tort claim because it merely masked deeper foreign policy 
and national security questions in a different cause of action). But see Stephen I. Vladeck, The 
New National Security Canon, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1324 (2012) (recognizing the Supreme 
Court jurisprudence finding that not all cases involving military decisions are barred by the politi-
cal question doctrine). 
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CONCLUSION 
Through the Justice Against Sponsors of Terror Act (JASTA), Con-
gress has granted individual litigants and the courts the ability to infringe on 
foreign affairs powers typically and rightly exercised by the executive. Alt-
hough differing in their procedural consequences, a finding of liability in 
U.S. courts against a fellow nation for aiding, abetting, or knowingly 
providing substantial assistance to an act of international terrorism occur-
ring in the United States affects the tenor of America’s relationship with that 
state in a manner largely akin to an executive designation as a state sponsor 
of terror. Allowing for this disjointed foreign relations decision making, by 
lesser informed decision makers, threatens to upend the unity of America’s 
message to the world and disrupt the President’s role as America’s constitu-
tionally empowered representative to foreign nations. This disruption vio-
lates long standing principles of separation of powers. Moreover, JASTA 
cannot be constitutionally salvaged by the Act’s executive intervention pro-
visions. Unfortunately, Congress’ effort to promote the individual litigant’s 
interest in access to the court’s truth seeking function fails to overcome the 
greater national need for coherent and stable foreign relations. Congress, in 
its delegation of jurisdiction to the courts, has permitted an unconstitutional 
assumption of a function rightly coordinated by the President. Even though 
Congress has an important role to play in the foreign affairs of the United 
States, neither their foreign affairs authority nor the power to shape ele-
ments of the American court system suffice to justify a possible upending of 
diplomatic relations. As a result, the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism 
Act is an unconstitutional infringement by the legislature on a power more 
properly entrusted to the executive. 
DAN CAHILL220 
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